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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee, :
V.

:

Case No. 930009-CA

JAMIE LEE MORENO,

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of possession of a
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1990).

This Court has jurisdiction

to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (f)
(1992) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Was the officer's seizure of a paper bindle from the front
seat of defendant's car based on both probable cause and exigent
circumstances, the two requirements of the automobile exception to
the warrant requirement?
Although the Utah Supreme Court has held that a trial court's
determination of whether probable cause existed is reviewed under
a clearly erroneous standard, State v. Rocha, 600 P.2d 543, 545
(Utah 1979) (applying clearly erroneous standard in reviewing trial
court's determination that officer had probable cause to arrest
defendant), its recent discussion of standard of review as applied

to reasonable suspicion suggests that it will adopt a similar
stance with respect to probable cause determinations:
[A] trial court['s] determination of whether a
specific set of facts gives rise to reasonable
suspicion is a determination of law and is
reviewable nondeferentially for correctness,
as opposed to being a fact determination
reviewable for clear error.
[However,] the
reasonable-suspicion legal standard is one
that conveys a measure of discretion to the
trial judge when applying that standard to a
given set of factsPrecisely how much
discretion we cannot say, but we would not
anticipate a close, de novo review. On the
other hand, a sufficiently careful review is
necessary to assure that the purposes of the
reasonable-suspicion requirement are served.
State v. Pena, No. 930101, slip op. at 9-10

(Utah February 15,

1994) (footnotes omitted).
The

determination

of whether

exigent

circumstances

were

present is a factual question and should not be disturbed on appeal
unless it is clearly erroneous.

State v. Morck, 821 P.2d 1190,

1194 (Utah App. 1991) (citing State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258
(Utah 1987) ) .

Whether this standard will be reevaluated in light

of State v. Pena remains to be seen.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The

fourth

amendment

to the United

States

Constitution

provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution states:
2

The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, hcices, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
After a hearing in which the trial court denied his motion to
suppress, defendant

entered

into a plea

bargain, presumably

pursuant to State v. Sery. 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988) (R. 43,
62)- 1

He was thereafter convicted of one count of possession of

a controlled substance, cocaine, a third degree felony (R. 4 9) .
The court stayed the execution of a prison sentence and placed
defendant on 24 months probation, on condition that he serve 90
days in the Salt Lake County Jail and fulfill other educational and
rehabilitative objectives (R. 49-50). Defendant subsequently filed
this timely appeal (R. 53).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the evening of October 23, 1991, defendant approached a
woman on Main Street in Salt Lake City and offered her $35.00 to
"party" with him (R. 73). The woman, who was acting as a police
decoy, agreed and told defendant to follow her in his car (R. 7273).

When they arrived at the parking lot of the nearby Colonial

Hotel, defendant got out of his car and locked it
1

(R. 73) .

The only evidence attesting to the nature of the plea is
found in the certificate of probable cause, which states: "It is
hereby ordered that a Certificate of Probable Cause may issue in
the appeal in the above matter and the plea herein has been
accepted as conditional" (R. 62) . At no point in the record is
Serv referenced.

3

Meanwhile,

two

Salt

Lake

City police

officers, working

the

undercover operation with the decoy, also pulled into the parking
lot, one in front of and one following defendant's vehicle (R. 78,
83) .

Officer Harris approached defendant, arrested him for

soliciting, handcuffed him, searched him, and placed the items
found in the search, including defendant's car keys, on top of
defendant's vehicle.

Harris then accompanied defendant into a

police car, where he began writing out a citation (R. 78, 83-84).
Following the arrest, Officer Jackson, who was also on the
scene, approached defendant's car, looked through the window, and
saw "a folded bindle, the type you carry cocaine in" located on the
passenger side front seat (R. 79, 84) .
Officer Harris, who was sitting

Jackson walked over to

in the patrol vehicle with

defendant, and said, "I want you to come back and witness this" (R.
79).

Jackson pointed out the bindle on the front seat to Harris

and then, taking the keys off the car roof, unlocked the vehicle,
and removed the bindle.

It contained a white powder, which field-

tested positive for cocaine (R. 79).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The police officers' entry into defendant's car in order to
effectuate

the

seizure

of

evidence

in

open

view

was

constitutionally lawful because it fulfilled both requirements of
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
The first element, probable cause, was established when the
officer, prior to making any intrusion, observed a paper bindle
through

the

car window

in open view on the
4

front

seat of

defendant's car.

The officer's observation of a distinctively

configured piece of evidence was sufficient to establish probable
cause that the bindle was associated with criminal activity.
Second, the location of the evidence, presenting an obvious
invitation to theft and subsequent destruction of the evidence, as
well as protection of the public from access to the drugs, created
the

exigent

circumstances

necessary

to

seize

the

evidence

immediately.
ARGUMENT
THE
OFFICERS'
WARRANTLESS
ENTRY
INTO
DEFENDANT'S CAR AND SEIZURE OF INCRIMINATING
EVIDENCE IN OPEN VIEW WAS LAWFUL: THE
OFFICERS' OBSERVATION OF THE BINDLE PROVIDED
PROBABLE CAUSE TO EFFECTUATE THE SEIZURE;
PREVENTING DESTRUCTION OF THE EVIDENCE AND
PROTECTING THE PUBLIC FROM ACCESS TO THE DRUGS
CONSTITUTED
THE
EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCES
NECESSARY TO SECURE THE BINDLE IMMEDIATELY.
A warrantless search or seizure will be unreasonable per se
under federal or state law unless it falls within one of the
specifically delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 470 (Utah 1990); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514 (1967).

In Utah, in

order to fulfill the requirements of the automobile exception to
the warrant requirement, the State must establish both probable
cause and exigent circumstances.

State v. Morck. 821 P.2d 1190,

1193 (Utah App. 1991).
The gist of defendant's undeveloped argument appears to be

5

two-fold,2
observed

First, the folded paper bindle that the officers
on

the

front

seat

of

defendant's

locked

car

was

insufficient to establish probable cause to open the car door and
seize the evidence.

Thus, the acts of unlocking and opening the

car door constituted an unlawful search. And second, even assuming
probable

cause arguendo, no exigent circumstances existed to

justify seizure of the bindle without a warrant (Br. of App. at 34).
As to defendant's first contention, probable cause to open the
car door and remove the evidence was established as soon as the
officer, prior to making any intrusion, simply observed the bindle
in open view on the front seat through the car window.3
Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 181 (Utah 1983).

State v.

At this point, no search

had occurred, defendant had no expectation of privacy in the

2

At the suppression hearing, defense counsel referred to
State v. Hvah, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring), and Larocco, but failed to engage in any meaningful
legal analysis of those cases (R. 87-88). Similarly, on appeal,
defense counsel cites to those cases, but fails to analyze the
specific facts of the instant case in light of the law established
by its predecessors.
Under the circumstances, this court may
choose to assume the correctness of the judgment below without
addressing the merits. See, e.g. , State v. Amicone, 689 P. 2d 1341,
1344 (Utah 1984); State v. Steraer, 808 P.2d 122, 125 n.2 (Utah
App. 1991); English v. Standard Optical Co., 814 P.2d 613, 618-19
(Utah App. 1991). Nonetheless, because defendant has minimally
raised an issue both in the trial court and on appeal, the State
will address it on the merits, leaving the judgment call as to the
adequacy of the briefing to this Court.
3

The open view doctrine applies to preintrusive police
observation, such as is present in this case. In contrast, the
plain view doctrine is postintrusive, coming into play only when a
lawful search is already underway. See State v. Harris, 671 P.2d
175, 181 (Utah 1983); Texas v. Brown. 460 U.S. 730, 738, n.4 (1983)
(opinion of Rehnquist, J.).
6

contraband,

and

the

federal

and

state

guarantees

against

unreasonable searches and seizures had not yet come into play.
As the United

States Supreme

Court observed

in a case

involving a police officer who stopped a vehicle, saw a partially
concealed balloon, and then shifted his position to get a better
view:

"The general public could peer into the interior of

[defendant's] automobile from any number of angles; there is no
reason [the police officer] should be precluded from observing as
an officer what would be entirely visible to him as a private
citizen. There is no legitimate expectation of privacy." Texas v.
Brown. 460 U.S. 730, 740, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1542 (1983) (plurality).
The view of the Utah Supreme Court is consistent with the
federal position:
The constitutional interests protected by the
prohibition against unlawful searches do not
require the police to be less observant than
the average person. Nor must a police officer
avert his gaze from contraband because a
criminal wishes to avoid detection. A desire
to avoid detection of criminal activity does
not ipso facto give rise to a protectable
privacy interest.
Thus, an officer is not expected to ignore
what is exposed to observation from a position
where he is lawfully entitled to be, and he
may view the interior of a vehicle from such a
position. That does not constitute a 'search'
within the meaning of the constitutional
provisions.
State v. Lee. 633 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah) cert, denied. 454 U.S. 1057,
102 S.Ct. 606 (1981) (citations omitted).
Furthermore, the distinctive configuration of the folded paper

7

justified the officer's belief that it contained contraband.4
State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 124 (Utah 1983).

"Some containers

(for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very
nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because
their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance."
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 n.13, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 2593
(1979).

Indeed, this Court has specifically held, in the context

of the plain view exception to the warrant requirement, that
observation of a plainly visible paper bindle discovered in the
course of an administrative search is "clearly incriminating."
State v. Cornwall, 810 P.2d 484, 488 (Utah App. 1991).

Under the

circumstances of this case, the officers' observation of the
incriminating evidence in open view provided the necessary probable
cause to enter the vehicle in order to seize it.

4

On appeal, defendant argues that "there was insufficient
foundation that the paper [the officer] saw contained an illicit
substance" (Br. of App. at 4) . At trial, defense counsel made one
foundational objection to Officer Jackson's testimony, which was
overruled (R. 81) . Officer Jackson testified without further
objection, and then Officer Harris testified without any objection.
Although inartfully expressed, the gist of defense counsel's
closing argument and his argument on appeal was that the officers'
testimony was insufficient to establish probable cause.
The
testimony of the officers, however, plainly established the
probable cause prong of the automobile exception. Officer Jackson
testified that he had seen numerous bindles of the type found in
defendant's car during his three year assignment with Metro
Narcotics and that many of those bindles contained cocaine (R. 8082). Officer Harris testified that he had also been assigned to
narcotics and had "run into" bindles several times in his other
assignments
(R. 84) .
He also described in detail the
characteristics of the "pharmaceutical fold" used in constructing
a bindle (R. 85-86).

8

Defendant relies on State v. Larocco for the proposition that
the police officer's actions of unlocking and opening the car door
constituted an unlawful search.5

Plainly, just as in Larocco,

defendant here had an expectation of privacy in the interior of his
automobile.

As the United States Supreme Court has stated: "[A]

car's interior as a whole is . . . subject to Fourth Amendment
protection from unreasonable intrusions by the police."

New York

v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114-15, 106 S.Ct. 960, 966-67 (1986).
Here,

the

officers

had

probable

cause

to

seize

the

incriminating evidence prior to entering the vehicle, just as the
law established by Larocco requires.

The action here did not

reveal any new information, but instead only secured the item for
which probable cause to seize already existed.

Indeed, the

officers' actions can be more reasonably characterized as an entry
into a constitutionally-protected area necessary to effectuate a
seizure.

This distinguishes it from a search, which implies

looking in an effort to find or discover something and which
"compromises the individual interest in privacy."

5

Horton v.

Defendant cites only to the Utah Court of Appeals opinion,
ignoring entirely the subsequent opinion from the Utah Supreme
Court. Compare State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Utah App. 1987) with
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (1990) . Furthermore, Larocco was a
plurality opinion. As this Court has noted: "The precedential
value of the Larocco rationale is somewhat unclear . . . because
Justice Durham's reasoning was joined only by Justice Zimmerman.
Justice Stewart concurred in the result, but provided no insight
into his rationale. Because he concurred only in the result, and
because Justice Durham arrived at the result by using state
constitutional analysis, it is possible that Justice Stewart
arrived at his conclusion strictly through a Fourth Amendment
approach." State v. Stricklina, 844 P.2d 979, 985 n.2 (Utah App.
1992) i.
9

California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990); See State v. Echevarrieta,
621 P.2d 709, 710 (Utah 1980).
Nonetheless, probable cause alone will not suffice to justify
a warrantless seizure. Morck, 821 P.2d at 1193; Larocco, 794 P.2d
at

470.

In

addition,

the

State

must

show

that

exigent

circumstances justified the officer's seizure of the bindle without
first obtaining a search warrant. Ibid. In this case, the car was
parked in the parking lot of a hotel apparently frequented by
prostitutes. This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that
drug use is often associated with prostitution. Utah R. Evid. 201.
See also State v. Haves, 860 P.2d 968, 972

(Utah App. 1993)

(witness was both a drug addict and a prostitute); State v. Taylor,
599 P. 2d 496, 497

(Utah 1979)

(defendant supported her drug

addiction through prostitution); State v. Jones, 585 P.2d 445, 446
(Utah 1978) (same).

The bindle was on the front seat of the car,

in open view of anyone who happened to be in the parking lot.
Under such circumstances, it represented an obvious invitation to
theft and subsequent destruction of the evidence.

Prevention of

destruction of the evidence, as well as protection of the public
from access to the drugs, created the exigencies that justified the
immediate warrantless seizure of the bindle.

Morck, 821 P.2d at

1193; Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469-70 (and cases cited therein).
The officer's warrantless entry into the vehicle in order to
seize the bindle complied with constitutional strictures.

The

trial court, however, failed to make any findings of fact in
impliedly reaching this conclusion and denying defendant's motion
10

to suppress.6

Nonetheless, on appeal, "this court upholds the

trial court even if it failed to make findings on the record
whenever it would be reasonable to assume that the court actually
made such findings." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 775, 788 n.6 (Utah
1991) j

In this case, because

defendant's

motion

to

suppress

the trial
emerges

court's denial of

from

an

essentially

undisputed factual record, this Court may reasonably infer the
necessary findings to support the trial court's conclusion.

Id.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm the decision
of the trial court.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this V _ day of March, 1994.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General

6

After hearing the evidence at the suppression hearing, the
court took the matter under advisement (R. 88-89). A subsequent
minute entry states only: "The court having considered and now
being fully advised in the premises orders said motion denied" (R.
34) .
11
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ADDENDUM

3

March 20, 1993
THE COURT:

Call the matter of State vs. James

Moreno, Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The record may
show that defendant is present with counsel John Bucher;
Mr. Vuyk appearing for the state.
MR. BUCHER:

I would like to call the defendant

to the stand.
THE COURT:

That's not how we proceed usually,

is it?
MR. VUYK:

When we have police officers—I don't

know if they are back yet.

They had to run over to a

trial.
THE COURT:

Your motion places the burden on the

state.
MR. BUCHER:

I couldn't see them out there.

I

saw them earlier—
MR. VUYK:

They will be back momentarily.

If he

wants to proceed out of order, that's fine.
JAMES MORENO
Called as a witness, having been first duly sworn,
was examined and testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
MR. BUCHER:
Q

Would you state your name and address?

A

James Moreno.

5447 Breckenridge Road.

00071

4

Q

Are you the defendant in this action?

A

Yes, I am.

Q

I would like to call your attention to October

23, 1991, and ask if you have had occasion to come in
contact with any police officers at that time?
A

Yes, I did.

Q

What time was that, if you recall?

A

About 8 p.m.

Q

How did you come in contact with them?

Where

I was at 14th South and State Street.

Actually

were you?
A

I came—it was 14th Street and Main.
Q

In what city?

A

Salt Lake City.

Q

What occurred at that location?

A

They said I was under arrest for prostitution,

for soliciting.
Q

Is that the first time you came in contact with

the police officers that day?
A

Yes.

Q

Did you come in contact with an undercover

officer prior to coming in contact with the police
officers?
A

Yes. That would be the one that so-called

"solicited".

00072
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Q

When was that?

A

On the same dayr eight o'clock.

Q

And where was that?

A

14th Street and State*

Q

What occurred at that time?

A

A girl was out there.

headed to a party.
party.

I pulled up, and I was

And I asked her if she wanted to go

She said she was working.

I said I would give her

thirty-five dollars to go with me and party.
Q

And what occurred after you said that?

A

She then told me she would, to follow her in her

car, that we could party over at some hotel or something.
And I followed her, and when we got over there, she got out
of her vehicle.

I got out of mine.

I locked it, and all

of a sudden, I had officers flashing badges and telling me
to get back in my car.
Q

Where were you at this occasion?

A

At a hotel on 14th Street and State.

I don't

remember the name of the hotel.
Q

What did they say to you when they approached

A

To get back in my car, and I said, no.

Q

What did they do then?

A

Told me I was under arrest.

you?

And they told me for soliciting.

I said, "For what?"

I said, "I didn't

00073

6

solicit.

I didn't solicit nobody."

Then they told me to

put my keys on the car and cuffed me and asked if they
could go inside my car.
was hiding something.

I said, "No."

I said, "No."

They asked me if I

I just didn't want

them in my car.
Q

Where were you standing in relation to the

automobile when this conversation was going on?
A

Away from it, until they made me walk back up to

it on the back.
Q

What occurred then?

A

I was placed in a vehicle with cuffs on.

Then

they walked up and started the light in the cars. They
said, "I think he has something to hide or something.
Maybe that's a bindle or something."

They seen something,

a piece of paper or something and said, "Well, I think that
is reasonable doubt," or whatever.

So they got my keys,

unlocked it, went through it, came back out, said I was
under arrest for coke—possession.
Q

Did they ask you for your consent to perform the

search a second time?
A

Second time, yes.

Q

How many times did they ask you if they could

search your vehicle?
A

About two other times.

Q

What did they say?
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A

"Are you some kind of lawyer?

something we don't?

We have a right to go in there."

said, "Well, I can't stop you.
Q

Do you know
I

You are cops and stuff."

Where was your vehicle parked in relation to the

other automobiles at the motel?
A

Against the pool, facing north.

Q

Was it parked in the regular place where

vehicles park for the motel or parked in some other place?
A

There were other vehicles parked around the pool

area, so I would say so.
Q

Was it obstructing the lane of traffic inside

the motel?
A

No.

Q

What vehicle was that, that you are talking

about?
A

*78 Datsun station wagon.

Q

Are you the owner of that vehicle?

A

Yes.

Q

Is it registered in your name?

A

Yes, it is.

Q

Thank you.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. VUYK:

Q

You indicated that police officers asked you

twice to look at your car?
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A

Look inside, yes.

Q

Isn't it a fact that they indicated to you they

saw a bindle in plain view on the front seat of the car?
A

No.

Q

Did you make any statement to them with regard

to the cocaine?
A

No.

Q

You never told them it was cocaine for your own

personal use?
A

Not until afterwards I said it is cocaine.

Q

How long afterwards?

A

Way after I was arrested.

They brought it and

showed me and was taking pictures of me, and stuff like
that.
Q

Now, you indicate that you were under arrest,

and you were handcuffed and you were in a police car; is
that right?

Any question in your mind?

A

With the strap across me.

Q

A strap across you?

You were under arrest and

had the cuffs on?
A

Yes.

Q

That's all I have.
THE COURT:
MR. BUCHER:
THE COURT:

Anything further.
Nothing.
You may step down.
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MR. VUYK:

I would like to call Officer Harvey

Jackson.
HARVEY JACKSON
Called as a witness, having been duly sworn,
was examined and testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
MR. VUYK:
Q

Would you state your name?

A

Harvey Jackson.

Q

Your occupation?

A

Police officer for Salt Lake City.
THE COURT:

First name?

THE WITNESS:
MR.VUYK:

Harvey.

What is your current assignment?

A

I aim currently assigned to burglary.

Q

In October of last year, what were you assigned

A

Special investigations and vice.

Q

And on that occasion, did you have an

to?

opportunity to come in contact with a James Moreno?
A

Yes.

Q

How did that come about?

A

Mr. Moreno made a deal with one of our decoys,

followed her back to the Colonial Hotel. We followed him
back to the hotel.
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Q

How did your contact come about?

A

We followed his vehicle to the hotel by the

swimming pool area.

Detective Harris was behind them with

some emergency equipment on.

I went around to the other

side of the swimming pool and pulled in front of Mr.
Moreno's vehicle.
Q

What happened then?

A

Mr. Moreno got out, locked his door, stood

there, basically said something like, "You know, what is
going on, what's happening?"
Q

What happened then?

A

Detective Harris walked up, told him he was

under arrest for soliciting sex, handcuffed him, took him
back to his car.
Q

Did you, in fact, search him at that time?

A

Detective Harris didf yes.

Q

Where did that search take place?

A

Beside Mr. Moreno's car.

Q

What was found on him at that time?

A

He had some car keys, some cash and coins, that

type of thing.
Q

Where were they put?

A

On the roof of the car.

Q

Was Mr. Moreno then removed from that area?

A

Yes, sir.
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Q

Did you then inspect the car at all?

A

I walked back to the car, looked inside.

Q

What did you see?

A

On the passenger side there was, I believe, a

dark-colored, maybe black-colored cassette holder.

In

front of that looked like a folded bindle, the type you
carry cocaine in.

I went back to Detective Harris and

said, "I want you to come back and witness this." He
walked back with me.

I took the keys off the roof of the

car, unlocked it, went inside the vehicle.
Q

What did you then find?

A

I reached down, grabbed the folded paper.

It

was a bindle, unfolded, with some white powder in it. I
gave it to Detective Harris. He did a field test on it.
It tested positive for cocaine.
Q

Did you have a conversation with the defendant

after that?
A

I did not.

Q

When you looked into the car, was this bindle in

plain view?
A

Yes, it was.

Q

Was the defendant under arrest at the time?

A

Yes, he was.

Q

That's all I have.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
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BY MR. BUCHER:

Q

Officer Jackson, do you have it with you?

1

A

I beg your pardon?

1

Q

Do you have the thing, described as a "bindle"

1

1 here with you?

1

A

No.

Q

What did it look like?

A

It was a folded piece of paper, looked like a

1

piece of magazine or something just folded the way they

1

folded bindles.

1

Q

Well, how big was it?

1

A

Probably about that size, maybe an inch and a

1

And inch and a half square.

1

half.

Q

Could you see

inside?

A

No, sir, it was colored paper.

I

Q

Colored?

J

A

Well, like magazine, like it wasn't clear.

You

couldn't see inside.

1
1

Q

Looked like it came from a magazine?

1

A

That's what it looked like, yes, sir.

1

Q

Thank you.

I

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. VUYK:

Q

1

Are you acquainted with this type of bindle?

1
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A

Yes, sir.

Q

How do you have that acquaintance?

A

I have seen bindles many times.

I was assigned

to Metro Narcotics for three years.
Q

During that period was this the type of bindle

you normally found?
A

Yes, sir.
MR. BUCHER:

Object.

Move to strike.

I don't

think there's enough foundation as to his expertise.
MR. VUYK:

He testified he's been a narcotics

officer for two years.
THE COURT:

Overruled.

MR. VUYK:
Q

Is this the type normally found?

A

Yes, sir.

Q

And it was folded in a manner you normally

found?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

That's all.
RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. BUCHER:

Q

How many bindles have you seen in your two years

as a narcotics officer?
A

I couldn't give you a number, quite a few.

Q

Over ten?
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A

Yes, sir.

Q

And out of these bindles, that you have seen,

how many have been of this kind of paper?
A

I couldn't give you a number on that.

Q

Of the number that you have seen, of this kind

of paper, how many of them did it later—was it later
established in court it had a controlled substance inside
of it?
A

That's difficult to say, sir.

Q

Thank you.
THE COURT:
MR. VUYK:

Mr. Vuyk, anything further?
One question.

Were there a lot of

them wrapped that way that had cocaine in?
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:
MR. VUYK:

Yes.
You may step down.

Call Officer Harris.
DAVID HARRIS

Called as a witness, having been first duly sworn,
was examined and testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. VUYK:
Q

Would you state your name?

A

David Harris.

Q

Occupation?

A

Police officer with Salt Lake City.
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Q

Your present assignment?

1

A

Special investigations, the vice unit.

1

Q

Were you so involved in October of last year?

1

A

Yes, I was.

1

Q

Did you come in contact in October, I believe

1

1 about the 23rd, with Mr. Moreno?

A

1
1 °
A

1

Yes.
How did that come about?

1

We were working a decoy operation.

One of the

1 police decoys had made a soliciting sex deal with Mr.
1 Moreno.

1
1

I followed his vehicle to the Colonial Hotel

1 parking lot.

The vehicle entered the parking lot.

I

1

1 engaged my emergency equipment to stop the vehicle. After
1 following the vehicle for a little ways, Officer or

I

1 Sergeant. Jackson pulled in front of it.

1

stopped.

The vehicle

Mr. Moreno exited the vehicle.

1

Q

What did you do then?

1

A

I approached Mr. Moreno, placed him under arrest

1

for soliciting sex.

1

Q

Did you handcuff him?

1

A

Yes.

Q

Did you search him?

A

Yes.

Q

What did you do with the items you found on him?

J

A

I placed them on top of one of the cars—whether

1

1
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it was mine or his. Mine was directly behind his.
Q

What did you do then?

A

Placed him in my vehiclef passenger's side, sat

down next to him, began to write him a citation.
Q

He was in handcuffs at that time?

A

Yes.

Q

What happened then?

A

Sergeant Jackson approached me and told me that

he had something he wanted me to witness in Mr. Moreno's
vehicle.

I got out of the car, and Sergeant Jackson

pointed out the folded paper bindle, that was discussed
earlier, sitting on the car's front seat.
Q

What did it appear to be to you?

A

Folded bindle, pharmaceutical-type fold, orange

in color.
Q

What do you mean by pharmaceutical type?

A

That's what I have been told the fold on a

bindle is called—a "pharmaceutical" type.
Q

Have you had any experience with these bindles?

A

Yes.

Q

In what capacity?

A

I have been assigned also to narcotics and run

into them several times in patrol in my other assignments.
Q

They have a special fold, the way they are

folded?
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A

Yes.

Q

This particular item was folded that way?

A

Yes.

Q

And what did you do then?

A

I watched Sergeant Jackson open it.

It was folded in a little—in a square.

contained a white powder.
test kits for cocaine.

It

I took that, and I had field

I tested it.

It tested positive.

Q

What did you do then?

A

Placed it into evidence, eventually.

Q

What did you do.

Did you have any further

conversation with Mr. Moreno?
A

Yes, Mr. Moreno—just as I was beginning to test

it, stated, "It is cocaine."

And at some point, I don't

recall when—when I was discussed it, talking with him, he
said, "I am not a dealer.
Q

It was for his private use."

That's all I have.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. BUCHER:

Q

Officer Harris, what is a pharmaceutical fold,

again?
A

The paper is folded over several times so

that—I don't know how to describe it.

But it folds a

small square piece of paper so it can hold a piece of
paper•
Q

Is that it's only characteristic?

It is folded
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1 I into a small square piece or is it folded in a particular
2 I way besides that?

Let me rephrase it, if you didn't

3 I understand it.
4 1

A

I understand.

5 1

Q

Is the only way you could tell it was a

6 I pharmaceutical fold is because it was folded into a square?
7

A

No.

8 I

Q

Would you tell me the other reasons you could

9 J tell it was a pharmaceutical fold?
10 I

A

It looked like the fold that I have seen, that's

11 I been described to me as a pharmaceutical fold on a bindle.
12 I

Q

Would you tell me what that is, by size, the

13 I square shape?
14 I

A

I could describe how it is folded.

15 I

Q

Would you?

16 I

A

You get a square, and you fold it so that it

17 I makes a triangle.

Then you fold the edges over.

Then you

18 I fold the top, then tuck it into the—it is hard—fold the
19 I top over so it tucks into the bottom.
20 I

Q

Is the size of this tucking, the fact it was a

21 I square—is there any other characteristic so I could call
22 I it a pharmaceutical fold?
23

A

No.

24 I

Q

Thank you.

25 I

MR. VUYK:

Nothing further.
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THE COURT:

Step down.

Is that all the

2 I evidence?
3

MR. VUYK:

4 I

THE COURT:

That's all I have.
What are you claiming, Mr.

5 I Vuyk—plain view?
6 1

MR. VUYK:

That is right, Your Honor.

7 J individual was under arrest, had been searched.

The
It was in

8 J plain view.
9 I
10 I

MR. BUCHER:
THE COURT:

Your Honor.
This case that you handed me, it is

11 l a rather lengthy opinion.
12 J

MR. BUCHER:

Would you look—the first part of

13 I it has to do with, I believe, a plea bargain and
14 I evidentiary problem.

Page 16, I believe, begins the

15 I discussion of search and seizure in State vs. Hyde.

I will

16 I not impose upon Your Honor to read it or even tell you what
17 I it says. But here is what I think it says.

It says that

18 J in Mr. Lorroco's case, he wants to change the search and
19 I seizure law of automobile.

I believe what this case stands

20 I for, if you see something inside a vehicle and exigent
21 I circumstances exist, you go obtain a warrant for it.

If

22 J they saw what was obviously in plain view—a knife, a body,
23 l a syringe, contraband—if they saw a crime or contraband
24 J leading to a crime inside of a vehicle, that's what plain
25 I view is. Looking in there and seeing a folded up piece of
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paper I don't believe is plain view.

I believe it is

reason to believe that maybe something has happened, and it
could be probable cause to obtain a search warrant.

But in

my view of this case, Lorroco, his predecessor case cited
in Lorroco, State vs. Hyde, if my interpretation is
correct, the officers looked in there.
get a search warrant.

They needed to go

I don't think it is probable cause

to see a folded up piece of paper in someone's car.
think it was an excuse to search it.

I

I think that is up to

a magistrate, a committing magistrate, who has the decision
to obtain a warrant.
was under arrest.

This man was not going anywhere.

He

There was none of the problems that

Lorroco talked about, about reaching for a gun before
destroying evidence.
MR. VUYK:

It is clear it falls under the cases

where there was a legal lawful arrest.

They have a right

to look at the car and search it to determine whether, in
fact, there are any weapons or any other type of thing.
This is the entire process the officers had reason to be
suspicious when he jumped out of the car and locked it.
They were surrounded at the time. All this leads to the
question of what could be done. Certainly, we feel that
this was appropriate, proper, and done in the process of an
arrest.
THE COURT: Let me read this case.

I will have
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you a ruling within a day or two,
(whereupon the hearing was concluded)
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